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T
he following interview with Ilias Akhmadov was taken in 
January 1998, prior to his appointment as Chechen 
Foreign Minister, and renewed war between Russian 
Federal forces and Chechen separatists. The views expressed 
provide thoughtful insight as to how the Chechens perceive 
themselves and their conflict with Russia. More importantly Ilias 
Akhmadov provides a glimpse of how and why Chechens fight.
Can you tell me a bit about your background?
AKHMADOV: In 1991 I graduated from University 
of Rostov with a degree in philosophy. Ours was the 
first class in the Soviet Union to graduate having 
studied a non-Marxist curriculum. In 1991, when the 
events that we are all familiar with concerning 
sovereignty for the Chechen Republic occurred, I 
returned home. I worked for half a year with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time there was a 
big problem in the mountain region Karabakh. 
Basically, I worked on that, because there were 
individual citizens of our republic who would, on their 
own accord, get involved in that conflict. So the 
governing authorities sent me to get our citizens to 
come home. At the same time I participated in the 
search for those killed during the conflict, and in the 
exchange of prisoners. During the war (with Russia 
1994-96) and after I left the city (Grozny)—I was a 
common member of the militia for three months. When 
I was in the ranks of the militia, I simply did what all 
the other soldiers did. General Basayev, who at that 
time was a colonel, assigned me to headquarters, and 
for most of the war I served as an officer of the general 
staff. And then I returned to Basayev to serve as his 
adjutant. I had other duties when I was the adjutant.
Ilias Akhmadov (left) and unidentified Chechen in Grozny.
How does the Chechen military work? It seems that 
each field commander has his own army.
AKHMADOV: Basayev does not have his own army. 
He was the commander of the reconnaissance and 
diversionary brigade, which is the most elite unit of the 
Chechen army. Currently, that brigade, for all practical 
purposes, has been taken from active service and 
placed under the authority of the supreme commander. 
That is to say, right now the unit isn’t in the barracks, 
but in case of war we will form the brigade again. So 
we aren’t active-duty soldiers. This brigade has 
basically ceased to exist, and is under the authority of 
the supreme commander in case of war. The current 
structure of General (Salman) Raduyev’s army, 
however, is an autonomous structure. But that’s a 
complication of this transitional postwar period.
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There was no Chechen army to speak of before the 
war, at least not the giant army that the Russians talked 
about. All the other components and units were 
organized during the war by region because that was 
the only thing possible. That is, people—local 
militias—organized according to the region where they 
lived. Therefore, the fronts, of which there were seven 
(later, it’s true, they broke up from time to time, and 
sometimes there were as many as 14), were formed by 
region.
Concerning operations—a very large weight was 
given to the personal initiative of the company or group 
commanders on their own part of the front. 
Conforming to some general strategy, all operations 
were conducted at their discretion, and depending on 
the possibilities. Therefore, we basically left the 
Russians, who attempted to do battle with us by the 
book, in a blind alley. The commanders of all our 
units, starting with squad leaders, who commanded 
seven soldiers, all the way to the Front commanders, 
who, without violating the general strategy of the war, 
basically took personal initiative in a wide variety of 
ways. So at headquarters we didn’t have to write any 
special orders. Each person did all that he could, 
having thoroughly studied his own local and his enemy, 
and knowing all the possibilities. Therefore, this war 
was very mobile.
Now that the war has ended, the Chechen army is 
just barely beginning to get its own classical 
organization. Right now it is difficult at first glance to 
distinguish between this new army which is being 
organized, and the old army, which is comprised of the 
remnants of units which existed during the war. There 
aren’t any complex problems regarding the fact that 
right now there seems to be two different armies. In 
any case, they are equally subordinate. These are the 
remnants of those fronts and the remnants of those 
units that haven’t been added to the structure of the 
National Guard and parallel armed forces. When the 
formation of the new army is complete, all extra people 
bearing arms and wearing the uniform will put down 
their weapons and remove their uniforms. For our 
conditions our army will number no more than five to 
six thousand people, but that’s an approximation.
The war had three phases. On the plains the Chechen 
rebels suffered greatly. In the center, between here 
and the mountains, they also suffered.
AKHMADOV: First, there aren’t any Chechen rebels. 
That was a creation of the Russian mass media. The 
word “rebel” calls to mind a semi-underground illegal
organization. This organization is manned by “rebels.” 
But we never had any “rebels.” Unfortunately, some of 
our uneducated commanders got hold of that word 
without thinking too much about its implications. From 
this source it began to spread among us. As I’ve 
mentioned, as of December 1994, we had four active- 
duty units. Everything else was organized 
fundamentally as local militias. Then, toward the end of 
February, Dzhohar Dudayev gave the order to 
dismantle the militias, which then became part of the 
regular structure of the army. So, from February 1995 
on, we have had the armed forces of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria. So it’s not possible to call them 
rebels.
Phases? Well, if you make region the criteria, then 
yes, there were three phases. The battle for the city 
{Grozny} from 31 December 1994 to 23 February 1995; 
the battle in the foothills from March 1995 through 10 
May 1995; and on 10 May 1995, the large-scale 
invasion of Vedino, Shatoi, and Zhiyurt began, which 
the Russians managed to practically complete by June 
1995. The raid of the reconnaissance-sabotage battalion 
to Budennovsk under the command of then-colonel 
Basayev ruined these plans. Each of these three 
phases, of course, has different characteristics.
The battle of the city—urban warfare, even from 
the viewpoint of military strategy, is very complicated. 
Here is what happened; there was a massive invasion at 
dawn on 31 December from three directions with a 
force of about 650 armored units. Of course, all 
numbers are relative. It’s very difficult to say how 
many there actually were.
Now there is a lot of discussion about whether the 
encounter was planned or not. It’s hard for me to say. 
To tell you the truth, the outburst of the Russians was 
a surprise for me, because on the evening of 30 
December, cannonades could be heard somewhere off 
at the city limits. I don’t know how well informed 
headquarters was at the time. I was still an enlisted 
member of the militia, but for me the movement was 
unexpected. If one were to analyze this situation today, 
why there weren’t any barricades set up, and why the 
Russians weren’t met on their way to the city, we didn’t 
have the physical strength to organize even one echelon 
of defense around the city.
We had so few people, that it seems fantastically 
improbably now, but in reality, from 31 December to 
the end of January, there were about 450 permanent 
defenders of the city. That’s it. Simply put, all these 
forces were placed in front of the presidential palace, 
and the Russians made their way peacefully, practically 
to the presidential palace.
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The Russians went along, not obeying any of the 
rules of war, because the distance between armored 
units was between three and five kilometers, which is 
just crazy. They were all drunk, and to my recollection, 
neither the officers nor the soldiers realized what was 
happening the first day.
The Russians were cut off in the region of Zh/D 
train station. There was a very fierce battle there, and 
also in the area immediate to the canning factory. A 
part of the column was also left in the area of 
Khankaly. From 31 December to 6 January these 
columns were cut off. On 7 January the Russians struck 
with even more force. The strongest artillery attacks on 
the city took place on 7 January. The Russians then 
managed to bring in their transport units from the north. 
These units united with the groups that had been cut 
off, and the second phase of the defense of the city 
began.
By 17 January, there was no coordinated tactical or 
strategic attempt to hold the presidential palace. When 
it was hit by depth charges, the commander of 
Headquarters, Division General Mashadov gave the 
order to move to the second echelon of the city’s 
defense which was forming on the other bank of the 
river Sunzhi. All units defending the city had already 
moved there in an organized manner. In this way the 
second phase of the battle for the city began.
The basic tactic of warfare in the city was 
conducted by mobile groups of ten to twelve people, 
each group being armed with one grenade launcher, 
two snipers, and the rest with automatic weapons. 
Before 17 January, there weren’t any well-defined lines 
of defense. The groups were always on the move. This 
made things much more difficult for the Russians, who 
attempted to fight the war by the books. With strong 
artillery preparation, and support by frontal aviation, 
the Russians began to move. But after one or two 
armored vehicles were burned, and ten to fifteen people 
were killed, they fell back and then a week later went 
through the quarter again. In fact, not one quarter was 
taken by the Russians in the attack. They occupied 
only areas that had been left unoccupied by our units 
and the militias. If there had been a line of 
communication between our units and the militias, I 
think that the defense of the city would have lasted 
longer.
While the battles were going on in the city, Dzhohar 
Dudayev gave the order to form a line of defense by 
region. That’s how the seven fronts were created. Due 
to the movement of the Russian troops, certain areas 
became hotspots and received the status of separate 
fronts. Now it’s difficult to determine how many 
existed, and for how many days.
The situation was such that from the beginning of 
March until the end of the first ten days of May the 
Russians didn’t enter into direct confrontations. The 
largest losses on our side occurred exactly during that 
time period, because it was necessary for us to at least 
demonstrate our presence. The Russian troops 
occupied positions not more than half a kilometer from, 
or on the outskirts of, a populated area. The Russians 
stayed in place. The neutral zone was about one and a 
half or two kilometers. In the mornings, helicopters 
would hover over our positions and bomb us. The 
artillery was always at work. Contact occurred when 
our small diversionary groups could cut off the 
Russians when they moved in columns or when they 
transported provisions, military supplies, or water. The 
biggest losses our military forces suffered were from 
artillery preparations and bombardment.
On the 10lh and 1 llh of May, as I’ve already said, 
the large-scale invasion of these three basic areas by 
Russian troops began. The third stage of the war 
began: the war in the mountains. So the Russians 
managed to move forward pretty quickly in these three 
areas: along the Videnski ravine, the Argunski ravine, 
and in the direction of Shatoi. And these three key 
points fell within three or four days of each other. It 
happened pretty quickly. There was no chance of 
withstanding the air attacks. The most powerful 
weapons which we had were large-caliber machine 
guns, 14.5 and 12.7, for which there were almost no 
rounds. Even when we had antiaircraft weapons, the 
Russian troops inflicted noticeable damage. As I’ve 
already mentioned, the subsequent military operations 
that Basayev commanded stopped that movement.
What followed was fairly non-traditional if looked 
at from the viewpoint of classical warfare. 
Negotiations began which lasted almost a year. During 
this period of negotiations our troops occupied all the 
territory and entrenched themselves in the city 
practically without firing a shot. The next phase of the 
war began: the March 1996 invasion by the Russians. 
The truth is that the lack of military supplies due to 
losses of the already drawn-out war, and the 
shortcomings of the population created fairly 
consequential problems, so our troops once again found 
themselves pushed back into the unmaneuverable 
mountains.
Then we undertook two operations. On 6 March: a 
scouting operation into Grozny, when a small group, 
about 1000 people, went unopposed into the city and 
held it for five days. The Russians didn’t undertake 
one operation that hindered the entrance of our troops 
into the city. They were literally busy saving their 
lives. Basically, during these five days, the Russians
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didn’t take any initiatives at all. Then our units were 
ordered by Maskhadov to leave their positions in an 
organized manner.
August 1996, the most unexpected turning point in 
the war occurred for everyone, not only for us. 
Basically, our units again went into the city, and 
practically destroyed the Russian units that were there. 
Therefore the initiative of General Lebed is not nearly 
as humanitarian as it has been portrayed. He simply 
saved the remains of the defeated army. Two or three 
points were already entirely surrounded, where more 
than 1500 Russian soldiers were ready to surrender, 
and the only thing that saved these groups was 
Maskhadov’s order.
What was the significance of Basayev’s raid on the 
Russian city, Budenovski?
AKHMADOV: Well, in the first place, the Budenovski 
raid had more political than tactical significance. But 
if you look at it from the viewpoint of the art of war, it 
shows that, in spite of all the announcements about the 
reports of the Russian military leaders which were 
located in this military theatre of the Chechen Republic 
to the effect that our army was destroyed, or that 
General Dudayev had completely lost control of his 
units, the ingenious movement 350 kilometers inward, 
and the capture of territory, with a group numbering 
157 to 160 soldiers, speaks for itself. General Basayev 
lost only 19 soldiers during the ingenious five-day 
operation. Of these 19 soldiers, if I’m not mistaken, 
only three of them were killed by the most elite units of 
the Russian army during the five-hour blitz. The rest of 
them were killed during the confusion of the first few 
minutes, when they attacked the unit on the right side. 
It was very difficult because of the large civilian 
population around.
Then when they dug in and occupied positions in 
the hospital, they were surrounded. You can imagine 
how thick a ring the Russian army was able to make in 
the depths of its own territory. During all five days of 
this firestorm, only three people were lost. The 
positions were occupied with such discipline that the 
Russians were simply fended off. Basayev held control 
all the way until the last attempt. And the results of 
this situation were incredible. Looking at it from a 
military viewpoint, it doesn’t even make sense to assign 
credit. I think that even the Americans, and I don’t 
mean this offensively, when they evacuated their 
embassy in Iran, made many more mistakes than 
Basayev did when he conducted this operation. I think
that it has a very strong place, at least amongl 
operations conducted after World War II.
I’ve heard the war broken into three phases. How 
many losses were there in each stage?
AKHMADOV: Well, that’s fairly difficult, because as 
I’ve already said, the Chechen army still had not gone 
through a classical stage of formation. That is, this 
whole system of reporting losses and current strength 
exists in an army which has already been completely 
formed, thus making it easier to keep track of these 
things than it was for us. The total number of losses 
among our combatants was based on the fact that 
besides those who actually bore arms at the time, 
civilians who took up arms and came to fight with us 
were also included. They usually suffered most of the 
losses, those who didn’t have experience. And 
according to the reports of our unit commanders, about 
3500 to 4000 of our opposition forces were killed. But 
many civilian people who only fought for literally one 
hour were killed. As soon as the Russians entered the 
city, anyone who jumped up with a weapon in his 
hands was killed within the hour. It’s difficult to 
confirm these numbers, so they are fairly relative.
Most of the losses that occurred during the battles 
of 1995 were of people who didn’t have a weapon and 
were constantly trying to obtain a weapon. The tactic 
was extremely simple. If a Russian soldier with an 
assault weapon was left in the neutral zone, Russian 
snipers used the following tactic: Whoever crawled up 
to the weapon first was wounded. He would, naturally, 
cry for help. You can leave a corpse until nighttime, 
when it is possible to retrieve it, but when a wounded 
soldier cries for help, usually three or four people 
would also die trying to retrieve a wounded soldier. In 
this way it was sometimes possible to kill, with one 
assault rifle, five or six people who didn’t have a 
weapon and wanted to obtain that weapon. These were 
the largest losses. Those units which were mobile and 
got around quickly suffered practically no losses. By 
the way, among those who were armed during this 
period of winter street battles in Grozny, we had even 
fewer losses then later during the battles in the foothills 
and the subsequent battles in May through June 1995.
The number of Russians lost is difficult to count not 
only for us, but also for the Russians themselves. 
Because they operated on the system of combined 
units. There were practically no numbered units here. 
The numbered units were located at their places of 
deployment, and from these numbered units, combined 
units were formed. A certain contingent of a numbered
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regiment was taken from two or three regiments and 
formed into a new unit that was not counted anywhere. 
Well, it is figured somewhere in the operational 
command of the general staff in Russia.
I personally collected about 2500 service records 
between 31 December and 7 January, that is, the 
soldiers’ army certificates. It also wasn’t possible to 
collect these papers from the corpses that were burned, 
and not every commander collected these papers. So 
it’s a fairly arbitrary number. According to the 
testimony of the general staff, during this one-week 
period, they lost about 4000 people in the city. The 
Maiyakopski brigade and the Samarski 181st regiment 
ceased to exist. About 350 armored units were 
destroyed during the New Year blitz.
The loss of soldiers was a problem to calculate. As 
a rule, any change of assignment for a soldier is noted 
in a booklet on the day of his arrival at this new duty 
station. A stamp is immediately placed in the 
operational area to the effect that the particular soldier 
has arrived at the unit and is ready for duty, and a seal 
is affixed. But among theses 2500 service records 
there were only a few dozen that had these formalities 
in them. The rest of the soldiers weren’t included on 
any list of any unit. That is to say, they didn’t exist.
What was it like for an ordinary member of the militia 
to participate in military operations? Can you relate 
any personal experiences ?
AKHMADOV: On one hand, of course, it was 
difficult for us to do battle with the Russians, because 
they were fully equipped. Take, for instance, one 
Russian motor rifle battalion. If you look at the level 
of equipment for their maintenance bases, their 
artillery, artillery support, air support, communications 
support, corrective support, and medical equipment, 
one motor rifle battalion was equipped better than the 
entire Chechen army. So there were a great many 
difficulties. On the other hand, one advantage we had 
was that most of the Chechens had served in the ranks 
of the Soviet army. Maskhadov was an officer in the 
Soviet army for a long time. He retired as a colonel. 
Most of the Chechens had served in the active-duty 
ranks of the Soviet army. For instance, I served in the 
Soviet army five years.
It is a very great advantage when the enemy speaks 
a language you understand very well. Tactics like radio 
misinformation were used quite often. The radios in 
absolutely every captured transport or tank were all 
tuned to the frequency of it’s own unit. Our radio 
operators often managed to get Russian firepower 
aimed directly at Russian positions. The tactic of
penetrating between two columns traveling in parallel 
was also used. This usually happened when columns 
were marching at night, or when we penetrated between 
two positions, because the Russians had a great lack of 
coordination between the units of the internal army and 
the normal army. It was enough to get between two 
columns, fire off a couple of shots in one direction or 
the other, and these columns would start to mow each 
other down, sometimes for two or three hours. 
Sometimes only when both sides independently called 
for air or artillery support, did they start to understand 
that they were fighting themselves. These tactics were 
used very often.
Then, we, the people who lived in the city, who 
know every little corner, often felt quite at ease and 
quite safe in the city. There were times when groups of 
up to 70 people made their way quietly through dead 
space when Russians were within 30-40 meters on 
either side.
Basically, the knowledge of the language, the 
knowledge of the Russian psychology, and the structure 
of their philosophy was a great advantage. The 
Russian army is not very different from the Soviet 
army. The only difference is that there are no 
Chechens in the Russian army. It’s the same 
tremendously large and immobile machine that the 
Soviet army was. It was very easy to take advantage of 
that. The Chechens speak Russian without and accent 
and it wasn’t difficult to lead them astray. And then at 
night the Russians became interested only in the area in 
which they were physically located. They lost interest 
in everything that didn’t concern their personal safety. 
That’s a terrible shortcoming of an invading soldier. 
Therefore our troops came to life at night. Constant 
movement and night battles. This really wore the 
Russians down. Those were the basic tactics. So, for 
instance, thinking about Remarque’s novel, All Quiet 
on the Western Front, that, of course, was a completely 
different war.
Regarding the death of the first president of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, General Dudayev, well, 
a big mistake that many Western observers and the 
Russians made was to attempt to characterize the war 
on our territory from 1994 to 1996 according to 
classical military thinking. I’ll give you an analogous 
example: The Russians stubbornly tried to raise an 
ensign over the remains of Rezkom, the building that is 
the presidential residence here. General Maskhadov 
ordered the defenders to desert it because there wasn’t 
any tactical or strategic reason to preserve it. It was 
simply a ruined building.
Russians didn’t approach the building for another 
12 hours, and then raised some rag. I don’t even
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remember which one. Maybe it was from the 144th 
motor rifle regiment. Look at the commotion that was 
caused by the raising of the ensign over the remains of 
the Rezkom. The Russians thought that if they raised 
that rag over this palace that the war was over. It was 
stupid. The Chechens have led a regular, systematic, 
and continuous war against the Russians for 300 years, 
since 1708 AD, you could say. We’ll continue to fight 
as long as there is one square foot of land on which we 
can stand, and as long as we are still alive.
For us, classical European examples, such as the 
raising of an ensign over the remains of a presidential 
palace, don’t mean anything. It’s the same thing 
concerning the death of Dudayev. General Dudayev 
died like a soldier at his post. His death didn’t give rise 
to any disappointment of the Chechens, and of course 
it didn’t weaken us in any way. For a Chechen at war, 
the highest reward is death. So Dudayev found himself 
among those who Allah had smiled upon. The death of 
Dudayev didn’t give rise to any infighting or 
perturbations among the Chechen leadership. 
Everything continued as before. Everything was 
accepted as the natural consequences of war. On the 
death of Dudayev, in accordance with the constitution 
of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, his vice president, 
Inderbiev, took his place. Yes, we accepted the fact 
with sorrow, but it didn’t shake anyone’s belief in the 
truth we are fighting for. So we accept it all very 
philosophically. Chechens accept death very 
philosophically, especially during war. General 
Dudayev was worthy of the death of a soldier. We are 
just proud that he courageously went down the path 
that Allah laid down for him on this Earth, from the 
beginning until the end.
The cult of the warrior is strong in Chechnya. Can you 
comment on this, and also on the role that religion 
plays?
AKHMADOV: I think that Chechens are a peaceful 
people, but Chechens are warriors. To be a warrior is 
to have a deeper and broader understanding than people 
who are simply warmongers. Yes, Chechens are 
warriors, but Chechens aren’t like classical warriors. 
Chechens take life in the barracks very hard, because as 
you know, barracks life, with all its characteristics, 
subverts any individuality a person has. Although 
Chechens are warriors, that doesn’t stop us from 
feeling the joy of life and beauty, or to be philosophers.
Concerning religion among the Chechens, there is 
a strong Sufi influence among us. That is to say,
Islamic philosophy. Almost every Chechen is an 
autonomous Sufi. That’s a rather complex side of our 
life, and difficult to explain within the boundaries of 
this interview. But in spite of, and maybe because of 
the fact that for practically 400 years, we have been in 
a state of war, we prize peace, and all that is connected 
with life. You see, after such a terrible apocalypse, and 
among all these ruins, you can still see so many people 
laughing. Chechens accept it philosophically.
It doesn’t really scare us that our buildings have 
been destroyed. Earlier, during the Russian-Caucasus 
war, you built during the night, and nobody could give 
you a guarantee that the village would last until 
tomorrow. In spite of that, people built in order to have 
a normal place to live for at least one day. The next 
day the Russians would come and destroy the village. 
The Chechens didn’t give up. They built another village 
again, and it went on like that. I’ll tell you that for the 
Chechens to be like the Russians, who love everything 
connected with a material life, would be very difficult.
I’ll tell you a quote from a general who participated 
in that old war, Major General Ol’shevski. In his 
memoirs, An Expedition in the Caucasus, he writes 
something which very strongly grabbed my attention, 
and burned itself into my memory. It went 
approximately like this: the concept of property among 
the Chechen people is absolutely atrophied. When we 
invade their cities, you don’t see any Chechen 
anywhere trying to save his belongings or any of his 
wealth. All of them, from the youngest to the oldest, 
are motivated by one desire-—to shed as much of the 
invaders’ blood as possible. That is, in that moment 
when war breaks out, none of these things have any 
meaning. Everyone turns all of their attention on the 
war in order to defend their freedom and independence. 
Of course this didn’t just crystallize in one day. In 
order to become who we are today, the Chechens have 
gone through a great many ordeals, which probably not 
every nation has had to pass through. And 
nevertheless, in spite of all the negative things which 
are evident here, I think that the Chechens are very 
good people who courageously face life, and who are 
very aware of the space they occupy and the period of 
time they are in.
What strategic significance do the mountains have?
AKHMADOV: The mountains? The mountains have 
many meanings, and they are all important for us. But 
first and foremost, the mountains have made us who we 
are. Secondly, the Almighty punished us on this slice 
of the Northern Caucasus because it turns out that our
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people inhabited a strategic position. That is, whether 
or not we want to admit it, we occupy a key position, 
both political and military, and by virtue of this we also 
play an important role in forming the mentality of the 
Northern Caucasus. There are many mountains, and 
it’s because of these mountains. The mountains have 
done this to us, and I think that trying to consider them 
only as a natural defense undermines their significance. 
No, it’s an outlook on life: an enormous philosophical 
outlook which formed this population that today enjoys 
peace. In short, it’s the Chechens.
There are many different ethnic groups in Dagestan; 
does that play a role in the situation in Dagestan!
AKHMADOV: The war in Chechnya was quite 
natural. Chechnya never voluntarily entered into a 
dependent relationship with Russia. But Dagestan, in 
spite of the fact that part of Dagestan took part in the 
Russian-Caucasian war under the leadership of Imam 
Shaganin, in time was broken up into Hun-ruled 
territories and displayed its will to be loyal to the 
rulers. And therefore, only a small part of Dagestan 
fought in the last war, and for the Russians it’s a sort of 
outpost between Transcaucasia and the Northern 
Caucasus. You can consider it that way. If uprisings 
occur in Dagestan, then I think the situation will 
radically change the shape of things in the Northern 
Caucasus.
There is another problem that differentiates the 
situation in Dagestan from that in Chechnya. The 
Chechens never had any interdependent relations. That 
is, there weren’t ever any feudal lords. Everyone was 
equal. In Dagestan slavery flourished among some 
groups and there were only a few groups which 
managed to maintain any kind of independence. So a 
sort of Dagestan aristocracy developed. And that also 
had something to do with Dagestan’s participation in 
the war. Today it’s represented by clans. When they 
talk about clans in Chechnya, that’s nonsense. The 
only clans that exist in Chechnya are those that the 
Soviet system gave rise to. That is, a person is 
appointed to some post, and a clan formed around him. 
But this clan wasn’t connected by genealogy. There 
was no blood connection. A clan could be made up of 
me and my friend, who shares my things of value, from 
my possessions to my food. It’s a little bit different in 
Dagestan. There are many more people making up the 
political process than in Chechnya. So there’s a very 
complicated mass of political collisions. If there is a
Older generation of Chechen warriors.
flare-up there, I’m sure that the situation in the 
Northern Caucasus will change radically.
Will the Russians take action against Chechnya 
because, either officially or unofficially, Chechnya is 
helping Dagestan?
AKHMADOV: It’s obvious that the Russians will take 
action not only in the case of a war with Dagestan, but 
in any spot in the Northern Caucasus and even in 
Transcaucasia. Now there are a few hotspots. They 
are the problem in Abkhazia and Georgia, the problem 
of Southern Ossetia and Georgia, the problem of 
Ingushetia and Ossetia, and the problem of Dagestan. 
In all these spots, literally, the situation is such that 
probably only a small push would be needed to start 
things. They haven’t quieted down and they aren’t 
solved. They’ve just been muffled. It’s just like 
doping up a sick person on morphine to take away the 
pain, and then doing nothing about his illness. At the 
present time, the Russians don’t have any mechanism 
to solve such problems. And if, in even one of these 
spots, military action begins to take place, I think the 
Russians will take extreme measures to block the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. I think that if a war 
doesn’t happen in Dagestan, you could expect direct 
interference in Chechnya from Russia, who would 




I think it will still be a long time before one can 
peacefully sigh and say that in the Caucasus some sort 
of stability has been achieved. Perhaps Chechnya will 
flower on its own now. We can build our production, 
and resolve our social problems. Maybe Dagestan will 
be on its own. But until that time when all of the 
populations of the Northern Caucasus obtain their 
independence, they won’t have the opportunity to 
establish their own governments. Then this problem 
will continue. As long as Russia still has a presence 
here, we will always have either active conflicts or the 
potential for conflict. But the Russian process of 
leaving the Caucasus began in 1991. They came here 
with much bloodshed, and they’ll leave here with much 
bloodshed. There’s no doubt! I don’t know how long 
it will last. Maybe 50, maybe 100 years. But the 
process has begun. I think that the explosive potential 
of this region will disappear only when the Russians 
are gone.
Despite our small numbers, the Chechens have 
survived, thanks to the fact that we follow our 
principles. And one of our principles happens to be 
that one should help the weak. To help the weak 
defend their own freedom, because there is nothing 
greater than freedom. We have declared that for 300 
years, paying for it with our own blood, and always 
motivated by this freedom.
Dodge Billingsley has been engaged in security 
research in the Caucasus since 1993. He has worked 
on defense-related films for the History Channel and 
the Discovery Channel. He is the producer and 
director of the film" Immortal Fortress: A Look Inside 
Chechnya’s Warrior Culture," awarded the 1999 
Bronze Plaque.
What is the nature of Chechen support in the Dagestan 
war?
AKHMADOV: I can answer this question from a 
political viewpoint. I think that support that expresses 
itself in terms of equipment, ammunition, or soldiers 
sent there is insignificant compared to the fact that the 
war in Dagestan is a war for national freedom. It’s the 
fact that we fought the Russian Empire together with 
the Dagestanis for many years. I think it’s a war with 
which we empathize in our hearts. I’m not talking 
about the government, that is the business of official 
politics, but empathy in the hearts of every Chechen. 
That’s the only answer I can give.
Concerning the previous point, in which I said that 
the Chechens have empathy in their hearts. The war in 
Abkhazia, Georgia versus Abkhazia, gave rise to that 
feeling in the hearts of Chechens. As a result Abkhazia 
won. Little Abkhazia was victorious over enormous 
Georgia. But it’s very important to remember that in 
that war
the Chechens did not fight the Georgians. The 
Chechens simply followed their principle: they helped 
the little guy. If Russia invaded Georgia today, and I’m 
simply talking about the common people, the Chechens 
would go help the Georgians.
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